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DEPUTIZATION AND PARENT-SUBSIDIARY
INTERLOCKS UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT
American corporations have used an array of methods to frustrate
the restrictions on interlocking directorates contained in section 8 of the
Clayton Act.' In its simplest form, an interlocking directorate arises
when a single individual sits on the boards of directors of competing
companies. Concern over increased concentrations of power in
financial, industrial, and manufacturing circles,2 in part the result of
1. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more corporations, any
one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than
$1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking associa-
tions, trust companies, and common carriers ... if such corporations are or shall have
been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so
that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a viola-
tion of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
2. See, e.g., the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629 (1953):
More subtle [than asset acquisitions in creating monopolies and restraints of trade] are
interlocking arrangements between directorates. This can accomplish disastrous conse-
quences, as Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out forty years ago. Interlocking directorates
between companies which compete stifle the competition. Or to use the words of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, the practice substitutes "the puli of privilege for the push of manhood."
Moreover, those entwined relations are the stuff out of which concentration of financial
power over American industry was built and is maintained.
Id at 636 (footnote omitted).
Shortly before his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1916, Louis Brandeis authored a
number of books and articles that were primarily responsible for bringing to light the need for
regulation of interlocking directorates. See L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914); Bran-
deis, Breaking the Money Trusts, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 1913, at 10; id, Nov. 29, 1913, at 9;
id, Dec. 6, 1913, at 13; id, Dec. 13, 1913, at 10;id, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10; id, Dec. 27, 1913, at 18;
id, Jan. 3, 1914, at 11; id, Jan. 10, 1914, at 18; id, Jan. 17, 1914, at 18. As Brandeis observed:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws human
and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and
to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each other, it
tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two
masters. In either event it tends to inefficiency; for it removes incentive and destroys
soundness ofjudgment. It is undemocratic, for it rejects the platform: "A fair field and
no favors,"--substituting the pull of privilege for the push of manhood.
Brandeis, The Endless Chaix" Interlocking Directorates, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 1914, at 13.
A final persuasive plea for congressional action on interlocking directorates is found in Presi-
dent Woodrow Wilson's January 20, 1914 statement to Congress. In it, he emphasized the need
for
laws which will effectually prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel of the
directorates of great corporations-banks and railroads, industrial, commercial, and
public-service bodies---as in effect result in making those who borrow and those who
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such interlocks, prompted enactment of section 8 in 1914 as a compo-
nent of the Clayton Act.3 Section 8 is, however, confined to direct in-
terlocks between directly competing corporations.4 Indirect
interlocking relationships, left unregulated, have allowed corporations
to develop the power and influence over competition that Congress in-
tended to preclude.' The indirect interlock has consequently become a
common and invaluable means of achieving anticompetitive intercor-
porate communication and control.6
lend practically one and the same, those who sell and those who buy but the same per-
sons trading with one another under different names and in different combinations, and
those who affect to compete in fact partners and masters of some whole field of business.
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914).
3. For a discussion of the historical context within which § 8 was enacted and a brief over-
view of the legislative history of the statute, see STAFF OF THE ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE
HOUSE Comm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORPO-
RATE MANAGEMENT 1-5, 15-29 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]; FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.R. Doc. No. 652, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1951) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]; 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIzATIONs: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 20.01 (1981); Halverson, Inter-
locking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspec.
dye, 21 VIL. L. REV. 393, 396-98 (1976); Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relationshps Be
Subject to Regulation and, If So, What Kind?, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 344-45 (1976); Kramer,
Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266 (1950) (includes
extensive discussion of early enforcement); Travers, Interlocks in Corporate Management and the
Antitrust Laws, 46 TaX. L. REV. 819, 824-32 (1968); Wilson, Unlocking Interlocks: The On-Again
Off-Again Saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 319-20 (1976); Comment,
Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 44 ALB. L. REv. 139, 141-43 (1979);
Note, Interlocking Directorates. A Study in Desultory Regulation, 29 IND. L.J. 429, 430-33 (1954);
Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks: Dealing with Interlocking Directorates, 11 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 361, 362-63 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Keys to Unlock the Interlocks].
4. This is the result of the requirement that the interlocked corporations "are or shall have
been ... competitors." See notes 17-24 infra and accompanying text.
5. See note 67 infra See also Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clay-
ton Act, supra note 3, at 150-53; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 365-66.
6. See generally STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-27; FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 14-16;
16C J. VON KALINOwsKi, supra note 3, § 20.02 [3][a]; Comment, Interlocking Directorates and
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 150-53.
A 1978 Senate study of interlocks among 130 major companies disclosed some rather startling
figures. For example, 123 of the 130 corporations surveyed were involved in 530 direct and 12,193
indirect interlocks with the other firms questioned. As a result, each of the companies involved in
the study was interlocked with roughly half of the others surveyed. The 13 largest companies
polled were each interlocked with approximately 70% of the remaining 117 firms in 240 direct and
5,547 indirect interlocks. But, as the report notes, the figures do not represent any interlocks that
might involve the 13 firms' 486 subsidiaries and the other 117 corporations surveyed. The largest
interlocker was American Telephone and Telegraph, with 31 direct and 625 indirect interlocking
relationships involving 93 of the 130 firms surveyed. The report concludes that the potential an-
ticompetitive effects of these relationships, such as conflicts of interest and antitrust improprieties,
could "impact on the shape and direction of the American economy." The study proceeds to warn
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A violation of section 8 occurs when (1) one of the interlocked com-
panies has financial assets in excess of $1,000,000, (2) all of the inter-
locked companies are "engaged in whole or in part in commerce," and
(3) the interlocked companies are competitors (4) "so that the elimina-
tion of competition by agreement between them would constitute a vio-
lation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws."7 While a
simple interlock meets all four provisions of the statute, an indirect in-
terlock exists when otherwise interlocked firms fail to satisfy the com-
petition requirement of the statute.8
This Note focuses on indirect interlocks in the context of section 8's
objective criteria.9 More specifically, it examines the present legal sta-
tus of deputization and parent-subsidiary indirect interlocks in light of
the sixty-seven year history of the statute. Because these interlocks are
often used successfully to sidestep the express restrictions of the statute,
their threat to the purpose of section 8 is substantial.
I. ELEMENTS OF SECTION 8
Section 8, by its terms, applies to director interlocks between banking
institutions and between industrial or commercial corporations. 10 Al-
of particular dangers inherent in indirect institutional interlocks involving financial institutions,
see notes 69, 79-83 infra and accompanying text, and suggests a per se approach to prohibiting
virtually all forms of interlock, direct and indirect. See Miller, Interlocking Directorates Flourish,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1978, § 3, at 2, col. 3. For an earlier study of the composition of the boards
of "Fortune 500" companies, see Smith, Interlocking Directorates Among the 'Fortune 500," 3
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 47 (Summer 1970).
7. See note I supra for pertinent text.
8. See FTC REPORT, suara note 3, at 14-15; 16C J. VoN KALINOWSIU, supra note 3,
§ 20.0213][a]; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 369-70, 376-77.
9. For a discussion of the fundamental questions involving direct and indirect interlocks
under § 8, see the sources cited in note 3 supra See also Jacobs, Interlocks, 29 ANTITRUST L.J.
204 (1965); Turner, Interlocks--4 Legislative View, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 331 (1976).
10. For the text of the industrial interlock provision of § 8, see note I supra. The portions of
§ 8 dealing with interlocks between banks and banking associations are not pertinent to the pres-
ent discussion and are omitted. Section 10 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976), also treats
interlocks, but it is narrowly confined to vertical interlocks between Interstate Commerce Com-
mission regulated carriers and service companies or suppliers with which such carriers have con-
tracts meeting a stipulated annual sum. Paragraph one of that section states:
No common carrier engaged in commerce shall have any dealings in securities, sup-
plies, or other articles of commerce, or shall make or have any contracts for construction
or maintenance of any kind, to the amount of more than $50,000, in the aggregate, in any
one year, with another corporation, firm, partnership, or association when the said com-
mon carrier shall have upon its board of directors or as its president, manager, or as its
purchasing or selling officer, or agent in the particular transaction, any person who is at
the same time a director, manager, or purchasing or selling officer of, or who has any
Number 3]
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though interlocks exist in other business contexts, the anticompetitive
impact of these relationships is most directly felt in the indus-
trial/commercial sphere." Paradoxically, the proscriptions of the
Clayton Act are most skeletal in this area, thus permitting indirect in-
terlocks to endure.12 The lack of express regulation of these varied
forms of indirect association makes enforcement particularly difficult. 13
The statute, as it pertains to industrial and commercial interlocks,
has remained unchanged since its initial enactment in 1914. The first
two conditions necessary to bring a successful interlock challenge 4 -
minimum financial holdings 5 and engagement "in commerce"16-can
substantial interest in, such other corporation, firm, partnership, or association, unless
and except such purchases shall be made from, or such dealings shall be with, the bidder
whose bid is the most favorable to such common carrier, to be ascertained by competi-
tive bidding under regulations to be prescribed by rule or otherwise by the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976). See also 16C J. VON KALINOWSK, supra note 3, § 20.04.
The staff of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary defines a
vertical interlock as one where a
[clommon director or directors link two or more corporations which deal with each other
but are at different levels in the same industry, as a manufacturer-supplier or a manufac-
turer-distributor. Vertical interlocks may also exist between different industries where
one corporation provides a service to the other, as in the case of transportation services,
and banking and other financial services ....
STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10.
Other statutes prohibit interlocking directorates in a particular field of commerce, giving pri-
mary enforcement responsibility to the department or agency whose function it is to regulate that
industry. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 10-13, 29-55; FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9;
Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Ana-
lyticalPerspective, supra note 3, at 395-96; Jacobs, supra note 9, at 214-15; Wilson, supra note 3, at
320-21; Note, supra note 3, at 435-38. The FTC report is particularly thorough in its discussion of
interlocks in specific industries, but notice should be taken of its early (1951) date.
11. The effects of commercial interlocks are especially strong when the relationship ap-
proaches "institutional" proportions with one or more financial institutions at the center of a
number of deputization interlocks. See notes 69, 79-83 infra and accompanying text. See also
16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.01, at 20-9. On the perceived necessity for congres-
sional action in the area of industrial/commercial (and financial) interlocks, see the sources cited
in note 3 supra. Effective interlocks in industrial/commercial contexts have a greater and more
direct impact on the average consumer than strictly financial interlocks because pricing and out-
put policies are most immediately affected.
12. For a general discussion of the forms of interlock, ie., indirect, vertical, etc., not prohib-
ited by § 8, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-16; 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3,
§ 20.0213][a], at 20-22 to 20-24.1; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 365-67.
13. See notes 39-63 infra and accompanying text.
14. See note 7 supra for pertinent text.
15. The general consensus is that only one of the interlocked corporations need have "capital,
surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000." As one commentator notes, a
fair, literal reading of the statute mandates that only one of the interlocked companies meet the
minimum size requirement insofar as the objective terms of the prerequisite are amplified by the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/13
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be established easily because of their essentially objective nature. Ap-
phrase "any one of which." Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act,
supra note 3, at 143 n.33 and accompanying text (emphasis added). The author notes, however,
that to avoid expensive challenges to interlocks whose potential anticompetitive ramifications do
not warrant such expenditures the FTC has adopted the informal policy of attacking only those
interlocks in which both corporations meet the minimum size requirement. Id at 143, 156. In
view of the per se nature of a § 8 violation, the administrative adoption of such a policy is ques-
tionable, particularly from a deterrence perspective. The per se character of a § 8 violation is
discussed infra.
16. Dispute exists over the proper standard to be applied to the "engaged in commerce"
requirement. Under § I of the Clayton Act "commerce" is defined as "trade or commerce among
the several States and with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976). Generally, this means that
the companies ship or sell goods to an out-of-state buyer or buy or receive goods from an out-of-
state seller. See 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[1], at 20-13; Comment, Interlock-
ing Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 143 n.35. A second theory
involves the more liberal "affecting commerce" concept used to establish federal court jurisdiction
under §§ I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976). See 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI,
supra note 3, § 20.02[l], at 20-14 to 20-15; Comment, Interlocking Directorates andSection 8 ofthe
Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 144-45. Von Kalinowski suggests a compromise standard in which
the "engaged in commerce" requirement is combined with the third element of a § 8 violation, ie.,
that the interlocked corporations be competitors. 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3,
§ 20.0211], at 20-15. Under this test, each of the interlocked firms must carry on at least some of its
business in interstate commerce. The competition between the companies need be only intrastate.
Such a rule, according to von Kalinowski, "would more closely keep to the long line of Supreme
Court decisions holding that federal jurisdiction does exist and an antitrust law can be violated
when an interstate competitor acts in the course of his intrastate activities." Id (footnote omitted).
Application of the judicially developed "engaged in commerce" requirement of § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), is perhaps most persuasive. See note 21 infra for the applicable
text of the statute. In United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975),
the Supreme Court went to great lengths to establish the distinction between "engaged in com-
merce" under § 7 and the less restrictive "affecting commerce" standard. Id at 279-81. The
Court held that "the jurisdictional requirements of [§ 7] cannot be satisfied merely by showing
that allegedly anticompetitive acquisitions and activities affect commerce." Id at 276 (quoting
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974)). See also FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312
U.S. 349 (1941). The Court continued:
In sum, neither the legislative history nor the remedial purpose of § 7 of the Clayton
Act ... supports an expansion of the scope of § 7 beyond that defined by its express
language. Accordingly, we hold that the phrase "engaged in commerce" as used in § 7 of
the Clayton Act means engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended
to reach all corporations engaged in activities subject to the federal commerce power.
United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. at 283.
A number of courts have applied this § 7 interpretation to the § 8 commerce requirement. See,
e.g., Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 53-54 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von
Brand, J.), and cases referred to therein. See also Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section
8/ ofthe Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 144. To the extent necessary for subsequent development of
the subject matter, this Note adopts the more flexible "engaged in commerce" standard estab-
lished under § 7.
In the parent-subsidiary interlock context it is frequently necessary to impute the business activ-
ities of the subsidiary to the interlocking parent to establish the latter as "engaged in commerce."
Washington University Open Scholarship
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plication of the final two requirements, however, has caused greater
difficulty.
The third element requires that the interlocked corporations compete
in the relevant product and geographic markets.1 7 Disagreement exists
over the proper tests to be used in determining whether competition
exists for purposes of section 8.18 Nevertheless, a policy has developed
whereby the courts 9 and the Federal Trade Commission 0 (FTC) ap-
ply, by analogy, the "line of commerce" and geographic market stan-
dards recognized by the Supreme Court in the section 721 merger case
This procedure, however, has not yet gained full acceptance by the courts. See notes 109-16 infra
and accompanying text.
17. "[I]f such corporations are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors." 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (emphasis added). The statute applies
only to actual competitors and not potential competitors. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 25;
FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 10; Wilson, supra note 3, at 326; Comment, Interlocking Director-
ates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 152. Proof of an anticompetitive effect
resulting from the interlock is unnecessary, STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 26; FTC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 10, because, as the FTC report notes, id, the statute assumes that such an effect
exists. Accord, STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 230. One commentator sums up this situation as
follows:
Since Section 8 is essentially preventive in nature, the government need not prove any
actual restraint of trade, that the two corporations are large enough to form a hypotheti-
cal monopoly, or that there is any substantial effect upon commerce. Instead, the com-
mon directorship is per se illegal if an agreement between the two competing
corporations to eliminate competition in some manner could violate any of the antitrust
laws.
E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 109 (1965). On the "elimination of competition" question
referred to in the preceding quote, see notes 25-37 infra. On the lack of empirical evidence sub-
stantiating the anticompetitive effects of interlocks, see note 153 infra.
18. For example, courts take differing views of whether competition must be more than de
minimis before the § 8 requirement can be met. Compare Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-
Montrose Chem. Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 171,678 (S.D.N.Y.) (§ 8 requires that competition
be more than de minimis), with United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (dicta that § 8 does not contain a de minimis exception to the competition requirement),
rev'd, 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686, 703-04 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
rev'd, 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981).
20. See, e.g., Jim Walter Corp., 90 F.T.C. 671, 741-53 (1977) (§ 7 case).
21. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, in pertinent part, provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen com-
petition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/13
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of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.22 In Brown Shoe the Court held
that the relevant product market is "determined by the reasonable in-
terchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the
product itself and substitutes for it."' The geographic market, on the
other hand, must "both 'correspond to the commercial realities'" of the
industry and be economically significant.2 4 Although applied in a less
than mechanical fashion, these standards provide structured criteria by
which to test the degree of competition between interlocked entities.
The lack of a definitive interpretation of the "so that" clause,25 the
final element of a section 8 violation, initially posed problems in appli-
cation of the statute.26 The 1953 district court ruling in United States v.
engaged in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition, of such stocks or assets, or of the use of such stock by the
voting or granting of proxies or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
22. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
23. Id at 325 (footnote omitted). The Court further concluded that product submarkets may
also exist for purposes of the antitrust laws and presented a list of criteria by which the limits of
such submarkets may be fixed. The basic product market formulation quoted in Brown Shoe was
established earlier in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (footnote omitted). See
also United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355-62 (1963), in which the Court, in
delineating the relevant geographic market, held that "[the proper question to be asked.., is not
where the parties to the merger do business or even where they compete, but where, within the
area of competitive overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate,"
id at 357; United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aft'd, 385 U.S.
37 (1966) (per curiam).
25. "[Ilf such corporations are or shall have been theretofore... competitors, so that the
elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the
provisions of any of the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (emphasis added).
26. A significant number of commentators read the "so that" clause, see note 25 supra, as
qualifying the competition requirement rather than establishing a separate and distinct § 8 requi-
site. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 25; FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6; Comment,
Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 145-46; Comment, Keys
to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 363. But see Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585,
589 (7th Cir. 1973) (lists only three elements of a § 8 violation: the $1,000,000 financial asset
requirement, the competition requisite, and, separately, the "so that" clause condition); 16C J.
voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[l]-[2] (author's treatment of the clause, although not doing
so explicitly, implies that it exists independently of the competition requirement). See also
Kramer, supra note 3, at 1268-69. Mr. Kramer, at one time a high ranking official in the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, posed the same question: "Was this ['so that'] clause intended
as a limitation on the preceding word 'competitors' so as to render unlawful only those interlock-
ing directorships between corporations that compete to a 'substantial' degree? Or is any amount
of competition, however slight, enough to outlaw an interlocking directorship?" Id at 1268. After
reasoning through interpretative problems in light of legislative history, the author concluded that
the clause was not added as a modifier.
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Sears, Roebuck & Co. ,27 cited as authority in all subsequent cases, re-
solved the issue by providing a substantive construction of the
requirement.
In Sears the Government alleged that an interlock between Sears
and the B.F. Goodrich Company violated section 8.28 The defendants,
Sears, Goodrich, and the common director, admitted violating the first
three requirements of section 829 but argued that their relationship did
not satisfy the "so that" clause.3" As a result, the Government's motion
for summary judgment3 depended upon the construction of the "so
that" clause adopted by the court.
Contending that the clause must be read in conjunction with the sec-
tion 7 merger test,32 the defendants alleged that the Government had
failed to prove that a hypothetical merger between the two companies
would violate "any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws."33
The court rejected this interpretation of the "so that" clause as underin-
clusive,34 holding that Congress intended the clause to encompass all
Taking the "so that. . ." clause at its face value, a strong argument can be made that
if the corporations in which the directorships are held could not lawfully agree upon
prices, they may not lawfully have interlocking directors. Such an agreement would
eliminate competition between them. Since price-fixing agreements are now unlawful
per se regardless of the amount of commerce affected, this interpretation renders the "so
that. . ." clause practically meaningless as a limitation upon the word "competitors." It
seems probable nevertheless that the courts will sustain an interpretation of the Section
which gives little or no weight to the amount of competitive commerce involved. This
view is influenced by recent Supreme Court opinions emphasizing that it is the character
of the restraint, not the amount of commerce affected by it that is the factor determining
illegality under the antitrust laws.
Id at 1269 (footnotes omitted). This effect was established judicially in United States v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See notes 27-37 infra and accompanying text.
The upshot of this result, the per se test, is that any interlock meeting the first three requirements
of § 8 will constitute a violation of the statute. The per se nature of the majority of the "antitrust
laws" referred to in the "so that" clause, see note 25 supra, mandates as much.
27. 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
28. Id at 615.
29. Id at 615-16.
30. Id at 616.
31. The Government's motion for summary judgment was granted. Id at 621. The action
sought dissolution of an interlock allegedly violative of § 8 through resignation of the common
director from one or both of the linked boards.
32. Id at 616, 619. For the pertinent text of § 7, see note 21 supra.
33. United States v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
34. The court stated:
[The defendants' construction [of the "so that" clause as relying on a hypothetical § 7
merger] would denude of meaning the phrase "any of the provisions of any of the anti-
trust laws.". . .This language is broad enough to cover all methods of violating antitrust
legislation. At the time of the passage of § 8, price fixing and division of territory agree-
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possible violations of the "antitrust laws" and not merely mergers in
violation of section 7.35 In so deciding, the district court established a
rule, thereafter the standard in section 8 cases, that a per se violation of
the statute occurs whenever the first three elements of the violation are
established and any possible agreement between the interlocked parties
would contravene "any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws."' 36
Under this per se rule it is manifestly difficult for a defendant to suc-
cessfully rebut an alleged section 8 violation when the three remaining
conditions are proven.37
Analysis of the statutory ingredients of an illegal interlock demon-
strates that section 8 is not pervasive in its coverage. The statutory re-
quirement that the interlocked companies be direct competitors makes
difficult the inclusion of most indirect interlocking relationships. What
scant legislative history exists supports the contention that Congress did
not intend section 8 to extend to interlocks other than the more blatant,
direct forms that come within the literal meaning of the statute.38 Re-
ments were in common use to effect such violations. Merger or acquisition was not the
sole means used to achieve this result. There is no logical basis upon which to infer that
the all-inclusive language was intended to exclude the other known methods from the
reach of § 8.
Id at 620.
35. Id at 617-19.
36. Id at 616-17, 620-21. Accord, Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588-89 (7th
Cir. 1973). In Protectoseal the court, in a private enforcement action under § 16 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), held that "[wie do not believe Congress intended the legality of an
interlock to depend on the kind of complex evidence that may be required in a protracted case
arising under § 7." Id at 589. The court elaborately dismissed any legislative intention to engraft
§ 7 merger standards on the § 8 "so that" clause.
37. Courts confronted with the "so that" clause issue after Sears have invariably applied the
per se rule there announced. See, ag., Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973).
See also 16C J. VON KALtNowssI, supra note 3, § 20.02[2]; Comment, Interlocking Directorates
and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 145-46.
38. "Unregulated interlocks ... are not inadvertent loopholes, but the result of a selective
and discriminating legislative approach to the general problem of interlocks. If the FTC's plug-
the-hole concept is upheld, such discriminating legislative choices could be wholly frustrated."
Wilson, supra note 3, at 327 (footnote omitted). See also 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3,
§ 20.01, at 20-10 n.16 ("it was not mere slipshod draftsmanship which created the loopholes
through which.., indirect interlocks... pass"). Most commentators dismiss the cursory nature
of§ 8 as the product of congressional inexperience in regulating interlocks. In its thorough analy-
sis of interlocking directorates in American industry, the FTC concluded that "[w]hen the Clayton
Act was written the Congress had no experience with legislation about interlocking directorates.
The provisions of the statute were apparently designed to cope with the problems that had become
most conspicuous during the two previous decades." FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. The staff
of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary later came to a similar
conclusion when it reasoned that
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gardless of the propriety of this construction of legislative purpose, use
of section 8 as an enforcement device against indirect interlocks has
been ineffective.
IL ENFORCEMENT
FTC and Justice Department39 restraint in enforcing section 8 has
aggravated the failure of the statute to reach indirect interlocks.40 Of
the small number of section 8 cases filed since enactment of the statute
in 1914, only a handful have reached a decision on the merits. 41 As a
[d]ivergences in coverage and in treatment [of the Clayton Act anti-interlock provisions]
manifest the exploratory and experimental nature of the legislation. Congress appar-
ently was reluctant to go beyond the specific management abuses that had been defined
at the time and promulgate a consistent policy that would define and deal with the root
of the problem.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 28. See also Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note
3, at 364-65. For a brief, yet detailed, overview of the legislative history of § 8 and the general
historical contexts within which the statute was enacted, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-29.
39. The FTC and the Justice Department are the agencies given responsibility for enforcing
§ 8. Jurisdiction is vested in the FTC by § l1(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976), and
in the Justice Department by § 15 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1976).
40. See generally 16C J. VON KALIwowsI, supra note 3, § 20.01, at 20-10 to 20-11; Halver-
son, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical
Perspective, supra note 3, at 398-400; Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relationships Be
Subject to Regulation and, ISo, What Kind, supra note 3, at 345; Jacobs, supra note 9, at 208-09;
Wilson, supra note 3, at 317-19 (includes chart of§ 8 filings and subsequent dispositions through
early 1976); Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at
139-40, 146-48; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 361 n.4. See also 54
B.U.L. REv. 659 (1974) (discussion of private enforcement under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1976), in view of Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1973)). For a
general discussion of enforcement in the early years of the statute, see Kramer, supra note 3. In
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953), the defendant-appellees argued that exclu-
sive § 8 jurisdiction was vested in the FTC under § I 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976).
In dismissing this argument the Court noted Congress' intent to establish a "dual scheme" of
Clayton Act enforcement. Id at 631-32.
41. As of 1965 the Department of Justice had filed but 10 cases alleging violations of § 8,
with the first litigated cases filed in 1952. The only suit to reach a decision on the merits was
United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See notes 28-37 supra
and accompanying text. See also STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 57, 227; 16C J. Von KALIOw-
si, supra note 3, § 20.01, at 20-10 n.19. The FTC, on the other hand, fied 13 § 8 suits before
1965 with all but one resulting in dismissal upon voluntary dissolution of the interlock. The one
exception involved a cease and desist order entered into by consent. STAFF REPORT, supra note 3,
at 57, 227. Of nine private enforcement actions filed before 1974 two reached a decision on the
merits. 54 B.U.L. REv., supra note 40, at 660 n. 11. For a chart of more recent § 8 filings, see
Wilson, supra note 3, at 317 nl. The first § 8 commercial interlock case to reach the Supreme
Court was United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). See notes 55-60 infra and
accompanying text.
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result, the statute has failed to become a meaningful force in antitrust
law, diluting any deterrent effect the measure might otherwise possess.
Because most interlocks are voluntarily dissolved upon the filing of a
formal challenge in a district or administrative court, few cases survive
a motion for summary judgment and reach a decision on the merits.42
Rather than litigate a claim to a final decision, the FTC is inclined to
settle the action by entering into a consent order with both the inter-
locked corporations and the common director.43  Such agreements in-
dude cease and desist orders prohibiting repetition of the alleged
illegal conduct.' To induce acquiescence in the consent order, the
FTC omits from the document any reference to the defendants' guilt or
innocence in the immediate proceeding.4 5 This concern with prevent-
42. See note 41 supra See also Jacobs, supra note 9, at 209; Travers, supra note 3, at 822.
Jacobs notes that "it is relatively easy to avoid being sued by merely resigning from one of the
boards before the Government files a case. Some people call this 'evasion'. I prefer to call it
'voluntary compliance."' Jacobs, supra note 9, at 209.
43. "There is nothing in the statute [§ 8] which restricts remedy against interlocking director-
ates to action by the [Federal Trade] Commission. It seems well known that the Commission has
found little occasion, and perhaps little incentive, to take action in the premises." Schechtman v.
Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1957). As one commentator has noted:
Looking back over 60 years of enforcement under Section 8, we find the FTC and
Justice Department lacking any discernible policy with regard to interlocks as enforce-
ment has seemingly drifted with a few peaks and many valleys. As late as 1960, it ap-
peared to many that Section 8 was simply a relic of a distant past and presented no
greater obstacle to an offending director than resigning one of his directorships, if and
when challenged by the government, thereby avoiding an enforcement action.
Goldman, Introductory Remarks to Interlocking Directorates: The On-Again, Off-Again Saga of
Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 45 ANTrrRusT L.J. 315, 315-16 (1976). Mr. Goldman states that the
1970s saw a resurgence of FTC and Justice Department activity in challenging alleged illegal
interlocks under § 8. See also Wilson, supra note 3, at 318-19; Comment, Interlocking Directorates
antdSection 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 140, 147-48. As these authorities note, the more
rigorous enforcement policy consists of a movement away from dismissing violations upon disso-
lution of the interlock in favor of consent decrees containing cease and desist orders. See notes
44-45, 52-53 infra and accompanying text. Despite the injunctive nature of the remedy, the con-
tinued low number of § 8 filings, see note 41 supra, would seem to belie this observation.
44. The power of the FTC to issue a cease and desist order is contained in § 11(b) of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976). On the procedural characteristics of consent decrees and
the benefits thereof, see Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks supra note 3, at 147-48.
45. An admission of guilt would be res judicata in subsequent private actions seeking treble
damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Section 5(a) of the Act provides in
pertinent part:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defend-
ant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be
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ing future infractions, as opposed to censuring current conduct, renders
the FTC consent order of minimal deterrent value.
Justice Department enforcement of section 8 has followed a similar
course. More often than not, common directors will resign from one or
more of the interlocked boards at the slightest hint of a contemplated
challenge by the Department. 6 Such coerced resignation, or "jawbon-
ing,,47 saves litigation expenses, potential monetary penalties in private
enforcement actions, time, and adverse publicity.48 This enforcement
through intimidation4 9 has since given way, however, to a more formal
procedure substantially akin to that followed by the FTC.
When the Justice Department's Antitrust Division5" files an action to
enjoin an alleged illegal interlock, the relationship is usually dissolved
by means of voluntary director resignation(s) from all but one of the
affected boards. The defendants then move for summary judgment on
the ground either that the case has become moot or that granting in-
junctive relief would prove unnecessary or ineffective. The lawsuit is
an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, that this section shall not apply to
consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken ....
15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). The propriety of entering into a consent order or consent decree in a
Justice Department action, see notes 52-53 infra and accompanying text, before trial is obvious.
Gambling on dismissal after the offering of testimony clearly could have serious financial reper-
cussions for an unsuccessful defendant.
46. The Department of Justice, in October, 1947, announced the results of a survey it had
conducted of 1,600 major corporations to determine the number of interlocking directors sitting
on their boards. Roughly 15% of the firms' 10,000 directors sat on the boards of more than one
company. Almost all of these interlocks were voluntarily dissolved without formal proceedings.
Kramer, supra note 3, at 1270-7 1. This episode is generally considered to be the first instance of
'Jawboning." See notes 47-49 infra and accompanying text.
47. See note 46 supra. See also note 42 supra.
48. See notes 40, 45 supra concerning private actions under § 8. See generally 54 B.U.L.
REV. 659 (1974).
Kramer is supportive of enforcement through "jawboning":
The Department of Justice's extra-judicial procedure for wholesale enforcement of
Section 8 is a novel antitrust enforcement technique. It has been customary to correct
alleged violations by instituting lawsuits. But if enforcement by administrative persua-
sion accomplishes the objectives of the statute, that method would seem to be not only in
the public interest but also in the interests of the persons whose directorships are ques-
tioned since it gives them an opportunity to resign without publicity and its attendant
unpleasantness .... In Section 8 matters, the relief is simple and specific: resignation
from all but one of the boards of the competing corporations.
Kramer, supra note 3, at 1271.
49. Jacobs refers to 'Jawboning" as "voluntary compliance." Jacobs, supra note 9, at 209.
50. The Antitrust Division is the enforcement arm of the Justice Department in antitrust
matters.
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thus converted into a hearing on the summary judgment motion."
Should the court deny this motion, the parties can enter into a consent
decree52 that contains an injunctive order similar to an FTC cease and
desist order.13 If, on the other hand, the ipotion for summary judgment
is granted, the defendant corporations lose nothing more than the di-
rect channel of communication existent before the voluntary resigna-
tions. The decision against issuance of an injunctive remedy is not
equivalent to a condonation of the defendants' action; it merely indi-
cates the court's satisfaction that such anticompetitive behavior-if that
it was-is not likely to recur. 4
United States v. WT Grant Co. , the first case presenting the
Supreme Court with the need to construe the terms of section 8, in-
volved such a procedural background. The Justice Department filed
complaints alleging three violations of section 8 and seeking an injunc-
tive remedy against future violations of the statute. 6 Shortly thereafter
the individual defendant resigned from the board of one company in
each of the three separate two-party interlocks 7.5  The Court reasoned
that resignation of a common director from all but one of the inter-
locked boards does not necessarily render the litigation moot.5 8 It held,
rather, that an injunction can still lie, but only in the event the court is
persuaded that "there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent viola-
tion . . . ,"I In W.T Grant the Government failed to sustain this
51. See. e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); United States v.
Ncwmont Mining Corp., 34 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). W.T Grant is discussed at notes 55-60
infra and accompanying text.
52. See generally Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra
note 3, at 147-48.
53. See Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 361 n.4.
54. See note 59 infra and accompanying text.
55. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
56. Id at 630.
57. Id
58. Id at 632-33.
59. Id at 633. See also United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199,
203 (1968). In W.T Grant the Court determined that a finding of mootness was not warranted,
but it nevertheless affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suits on the defendants' motions for
summary judgment. (The defendants originally sought dismissal on the basis of mootness but the
trial court converted their motions into ones for summary judgment. 345 U.S. at 630.) See note
60 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Newmont Mining Corp., 34 F.R.D. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), in which the defendants' motions, based on . T Grant and treated by the court
as motions for summary judgment, were denied under the rule of that case: "They [the defend-
ants] have not shown sufficient on this motion to establish that there is no genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether 'there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.'" Id at
Number 3]
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heavy burden, and hence the Court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the defendants."
Despite the efficiency of these summary enforcement techniques,
their use detracts from the deterrence value of the statute.6' The pau-
city of reasoned decisions on the merits in section 8 cases62 gives the
statute less coherence and predictability of interpretation than a sixty-
seven year old law would normally warrant. The present method of
enforcement will no doubt persist, thereby hindering the development
of section 8 jurisprudence.63
III. DEPUTIZATION AND PARENT-SUBSIDIARY
INDIRECT INTERLOCKS
Two common means of circumventing the competition requirement
of section 81 are the "deputization" 65 and parent-subsidiary66 forms of
507. In 1966 Newmont Mining entered into a consent judgment with the Department of Justice
prohibiting future interlocks with Phelps Dodge, the other interlocked firm. [1966] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,709 (S.D.N.Y.). See also SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1977) (volun-
tary dissolution of illegal interlock does not render case moot) (WT Grant examined); United
States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 706-07 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (thorough discussion of
mootness question), af'dmeL, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975); In re Penn Cent. Sec. Lit., 367 F.
Supp. 1158, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (alleged § 8 violation held moot); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) I 71,678, at 82,065-66 (S.D.N.Y.) (moot-
ness question discussed in context of inability of alleged violators to resume competition). But cf.
Jacobs, supra note 9, at 210 (questioning Supreme Court's conclusions in W.T Grant in view of
facts of case).
60. 345 U.S. 629, 633-36.
61. Halverson notes the logical result that "jawboning," see notes 46-49 supra and accompa-
nying text, "lacked the accompanying deterrent impact that formal prosecution possessed." Hal-
verson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper
Analytical Perspective, supra note 3, at 399 (footnote omitted).
62. See notes 40-41 supra.
63. But see Goldman, supra note 43; Wilson, supra note 3, at 318-19; Comment, Interlocking
Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 140. These commentators note a
resurgence in formal governmental opposition to alleged illegal interlocks. Such formal chal-
lenges usually result in injunctive consent orders and decrees that survive mootness claims on
dissolution of the interlock. See note 43 supra.
64. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 79-103 infra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 104-51 infra and accompanying text.
The term "parent-subsidiary" is decidedly inaccurate in that the interlock is between separate
and distinct parents or between a parent and a corporation without a subsidiary. See text accom-
panying notes 73-74 infra. Whether a director is shared by a parent and its own subsidiary is not
important to this discussion except to the extent that such an interlock evidences parental domi-
nance over the subsidiary, an issue that is dealt with below. See note 109 infra. The term "direct
interlocks between indirectly competing corporations," see Comment, Keys to Unlock the Inter-
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indirect interlock. Neither of these relationships comes within the lit-
eral provisions of the statute, 67 yet both, under proper conditions, cre-
ate an interlock as effective in terms of intercorporate communication
and control as a direct horizontal interlock between directly competing
corporations. 68 A deputization interlock exists when an outside corpo-
ration, often a banking or other financial institution,6 9 "sits" on the
boards of competing firms through its placement of different individual
locks, supra note 3, at 365, is more exact, albeit more burdensome. For that reason, it is discarded
in favor of the more convenient "parent-subsidiary" in this article.
67. See note I supra for pertinent language. Legislators and commentators concede that § 8
literally applies only to direct interlocks between directly competing corporations--te., it does not
encompass indirect interlocks. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-27; FTC REPORT,
supra note 3, at 13-16; Jacobs, supra note 9, at 204, 208. As noted by the late Congressman
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and the advocate of legislation to
tighten the grip on corporate interlocks, "Section 8.. .is as full of holes as swiss cheese." 110
CONG. REC. 5767 (1964).
68. "Indirect interlocks. . . are not covered [by § 8], notwithstanding the fact that such reia-
tionships may dilute competition as much as the direct interlock that is prohibited." FTC RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 26. For a deputization interlock to be effective the deputized director must
"stand in the shoes" of and effectively represent the deputizing corporation. See Cleveland Trust
Co. v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 699, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1974), af'dmem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir.
1975). See notes 78-102 infra and accompanying text. In order for a parent-subsidiary interlock
to take on the characteristics of a direct interlock, the parent must dictate, ie., closely control, the
policies and actions of its subsidiary. See, eg., Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra
note 3, at 370. The control and deputization questions are considered more fully below.
69. See, e.g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd
mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). At this point, the issue of the financial-industrial "institu-
tional" interlock arises. See note 11 supra, See also Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks,
supra note 3, at 366-67, 371-72. Such relationships assume many of the qualities of both indirect
and vertical (i.e., supplier-purchaser or creditor-debtor, see note 10 supra) interlocks:
The institutional interlock can be viewed as the third tier of interlocking relationships
between commercial corporations and financial institutions (notably commercial banks).
In a sense it is the combination of the vertical and indirect interlocks. The first tier is a
single bank interlocked with a single corporation, which can be analyzed as a vertical
interlock. The second tier exists when the directors of several competing firms all sit on a
single bank's board. At this stage, not only are there vertical interlocks but there is also
an indirect interlock among the competing corporations. The final tier (institutional in-
terlock) exists when the leading competitors in an industry are interlocked with several
of the major commercial banks.
Id at 366 n.37. On the widespread existence of interlocks involving banking institutions and their
propensity to result in severe anticompetitive practices, see Hearings on Corporate Disclosure
Before the Subcomm. on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures and the Subcomm on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Senate Comm on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
897-912 (1974) (statement of FTC Chairman Lewis A. Engman); FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at
15, 25, 27; Halverson, Interlocking Directorates--Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in
Proper Analytical Perspective, supra note 3, at 402, 406-08; Kramer, supra note 3, at 1274. On
institutional interlocks in general, see notes 80-83 infra and accompanying text.
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representatives on each board.70 In effect, these "deputies" of the
outside company function on each board as the common outside corpo-
rate director. This linkage of competing businesses through a third
party constitutes a violation, in principle, of section 8.71
There are two basic parent-subsidiary interlock models. In variation
I below,7 2 an interlock is established between noncompeting parent
corporations while direct competition exists between their
noninterlocked subsidiaries.73 In variation II, a director interlock exists
between noncompeting parent A and corporation B; there is, however,
direct competition between B and corporation x, A's subsidiary. 4
The controlling question in the parent-subsidiary context is the ex-
tent to which the parent dictates the policies and operations of its sub-
70. E.g., United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aId
men, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). See Kramer, supra note 3, at 1272-74; Comment, Keys to
Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 366, 371, 373-75. See also STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at
10. The deputized directors must be different individuals. If they were the same person, a direct
violation of § 8 would ensue because two competing corporations would then be sharing a com-
mon director. The controlling question in any presumed deputization situation is whether the
director is actually a deputy so that he sitsfor and as the common interlocking corporation itself.
See note 88 infra.
71. The question is one of proof whether the directors are in fact mere puppets, or "depu-
ties," of the outside, noncompeting corporation. See note 70 supra. Once an actual deputization
is established, attention must then be focused on the propriety of naming the third party corporate
director as a defendant-e., can the deputizing entity itself be found guilty of violating § 8? The
courts have yet to decide this issue definitively. See notes 92-101 infra and accompanying text. A
persuasive argument in favor of corporate liability under the statute is drawn through analogy to
cases arising under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976), the
short-swing profits provision. See notes 97-101 infra and accompanying text.
72.
VARIATION I VARIATION II
A B A- B
* /
x ... . . --y x/
interlock; .. e*•* parent-subsidiary; ---- competition
73. See 16C J. VON KALINOWsKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[3][a], at 20-23 to 20-24.2; Comment,
Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 365.
74. 16C J. yON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[3][a], at 20-23 to 20-24.2. The author
suggests a third form of parent-subsidiary interlock in which the tie is not between the parents.
Rather, two interlocks are created between competing subsidiaries and the competitors' non-com-
peting parents:
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sidiary:75 the more intimate the control, the more justified the
imputation of the subsidiary's business to the parent for purposes of
establishing the section 8 commerce and competition requirements.
7 6
Section 8's literal confinement in the industrial/commercial context
to direct interlocks between directly competing corporations leaves a
substantial void in which the deputization and parent-subsidiary inter-
locks, as well as other hybrid forms, 7 are allowed to persist. Notwith-
standing the mootness doctrine affirmed in W.T Grant,78 the summary
enforcement policies of the FTC and the Justice Department combine
with the narrow scope of the statute to make these two models of inter-
locking relationship particularly appealing methods of establishing an-
ticompetitive intercorporate communication without risking section 8
liability.
A. Deputization Interlocks
Deputization interlocks are especially suitable as a means for large
financial corporations to influence or control the policies and opera-
tions of businesses competing in a particular industry or a particular
A B
Id at 20-23.
75. See notes 107-51 infra and accompanying text.
76. Id The importance of the control issue was recognized three decades ago by Victor H.
Kramer, a former high ranking official in the Justice Department's Antitrust Division:
[Dioes the Section [§ 8] apply to directorships in two parent companies each of which
has a wholly-owned subsidiary where the subsidiaries are in competition but not the
parents? Where the major policies of the subsidiaries are dictated by the parents, it
would seem that there is a strong case for holding the directorships unlawful.
Kramer, supra note 3, at 1268 n.ll.
77. For a discussion of the forms of industrial/commercial interlock not within the authority
of § 8 as the statute has been interpreted to date, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-27; FTC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-16; 16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[3][a], at 20-22 to
20-24.1; Kramer, supra note 3, at 1271-75; Wilson, supra note 3, at 326-29; Comment, Interlocking
Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 150-53; Comment, Keys to Unlock
the Interlock, supra note 3, at 365-72.
78. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text.
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product or geographic market.79 As the pervasiveness of the relation-
ship approaches what is known as an "institutional" interlock,80 the
anticompetitive effects become particularly acute."' In an institutional
interlock, the dominant businesses in a single industry are linked with a
number of powerful financial institutions through deputization inter-
locks.82 As participation in the interlock extends to other members of
the industry, it becomes increasingly reasonable to assume that an-
ticompetitive practices are being conducted. 3 A deputization interlock
need not reach institutional proportions to violate the principle of sec-
tion 8. Because of the literal limits to the statute's scope, however, en-
forcement efforts have proven weak in the face of even the most blatant
79. See generally Smith, supra note 6, at 52; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra
note 3, at 371 and sources cited therein.
80. See notes 11, 69 supra.
81. This omission [from § 8 of vertical interlock regulation] is of peculiar importance
with reference to interlocking relationships between industrial and commercial corpora-
tions and-concerns such as banks, that supply them with indispensable services. An in-
terlocking directorate between an industrial corporation and a bank may establish
preferential access to credit for the industrial corporation. Where several industrial and
commercial corporations are interlocked with the same bank, a community of interest may
be established that ir strong enough to be a substantial handicap to other concerns depen-
dent upon that bank for service.
FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 15 (emphasis added). The report continues: "Interlocking relations
between manufacturing corporations and financial institutions, notably the commercial banks,
constituted the most important series of interlocking relations found [by the Commission's study]
and also gave rise to the most extensive and apparently significant of the networks of indirect
interlocking relations." Id at 27. See also Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust
Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, supra note 3, at 402, 406-07; Turner,
supra note 9, at 337-38; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 371-72.
82. See notes 11, 69 supra. A deputization interlock requires representation of the outside
common director on the boards of at least two competing firms. An institutional interlock man-
dates such interlocks among all, or at least a large majority, of the leading businesses in a particu-
lar industry. A director shared between a bank or other noncompeting business and another
company, without more, would constitute at most a vertical interlock. See note l0supra. See also
Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Ana-
lyticalPerspective, supra note 3, at 402 n.47. Absent a vertical supplier-customer, creditor-debtor,
etc. relationship or the existence of competing subsidiaries, the interlock probably would not
arouse suspicion. At present, even vertical interlocks are not within the reach of § 8. See STAFF
REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-27; 16C J. VON KALINOWSlI, supra note 3, § 20.02[3][b]; Comment,
Interlocking Directorates and Section of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 151-52; Comment, Keys to
Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 365-66. Creditor-debtor interlocks may result from con-
tractural provisions or other agreements for the extension of credit and are perhaps distinguisha-
ble. Possibly the largest number of interlocks flowing from a single financial corporation involved
J.P. Morgan & Co. Governmental pressures forced the company's withdrawal from many of these
interlocks shortly before the Clayton Act became law, although a substantial number continued.
See 16C J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.01, at 20-4 to 20-6; Kramer, supra note 3, at 1266.
83. See note 81 supra; note 153 infra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/13
Number 3] PARENT-SUBSIDIARY INTERLOCKS
deputization interlocks. 4
United States v. Cleveland Trust Co. 85 provided a significant opportu-
nity for a federal court to define the permissible limits of a deputization
interlock. The interlock between the financial corporation, Cleveland
Trust, and two industrial firms was typical of deputization interlocks.86
To avoid an obvious section 8 violation, the defendant bank placed
different individual agents, the bank's chairman of the board and its
executive vice president, on the boards of competing machine tool
manufacturers.8 7
As a prerequisite to testing the legality of the interlock, the district
court had to address two basic issues. Of primary importance was
whether the implicated directors were acting principally as agents of
the bank so that their presence on the boards of the competing compa-
nies was in a representative, rather than individual, capacity.88 If so,
and conceding that these "deputies" were proper parties-defendant to
the Government's suit, the next question was whether Cleveland Trust,
as the alleged indirect interlocking director, could also be found guilty
of violating section 89.8 Determination of the latter issue was crucial
from an enforcement point of view insofar as the noncompeting outside
84. See notes 85-103 infra and accompanying text.
85. 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aF'dmenz, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). Cleveland
Trust also presented parent-subsidiary interlock issues. See notes 124-28 infra and accompanying
text. The Government's § 7 cause of action was dismissed as moot. 392 F. Supp. at 708.
86. See Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 366, in which the fact
pattern used to define a deputization interlock is taken from Cleveland Trust.
87. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 702-03 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a f'd
ment, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). See also note 70 supra. The conclusions reached in Cleveland
Trust take on added significance because one of the interlocking individuals was not a director of
the deputizing corporation but, rather, a high ranking officer.
88. "Such informal links ... are clearly not sufficient to demonstrate a continuing principal-
agent relationship. The Government's theory of 'deputization' under section 8 is largely predi-
cated on Shaw (and Karch) [the alleged deputized directors] being important officers of defendant,
subject to its control and direction." United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 710
(N.D. Ohio 1974), af'dmera., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975). The "informal links" refer to any
personal ties remaining between Shaw, one of the interlocked personnel, and defendant Cleveland
Trust after Shaw's retirement as the defendant's executive vice president shortly before filing of
the suit. It was held, nevertheless, that injunctive relief could be necessary insofar as the defend-
ant was completely "free to return to his old ways." Id (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)). See note 59 supra and accompanying text. The case was resolved by
consent decree filed in 1975. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 92-101 infra and accompanying text. This question was explicitly left unan-
swered in United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 634 n.9 (1953).
Washington University Open Scholarship
962 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:943
interlocking corporation, sitting as a director through its deputies,
would be the actual violator of the statute.
Because it was merely ruling on the Government's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court found it unnecessary to answer either of these
crucial questions.90 In passing, however, the court refused to hold that
an agent of an interlocking firm could not be deputized for purposes of
section 8 or that a corporation could not be a director within the restric-
tive language of the statute.91 Considering both of these questions to-
gether-insofar as a finding of actual deputization is prerequisite to a
determination that the corporation itself is sitting on the interlocked
boards-logic and the internal integration of the Clayton Act compel
the conclusion that a corporation is a proper party-defendant in a
deputization interlock suit.92
Under section 8 "[n]operson at the same time shall be a director in
any two or more corporations. . ... 9 The definitional section of the
Clayton Act includes corporations in its description of juristic "per-
sons." 94 Hence, the internal structure of the Act dictates that a corpo-
ration can be a director and, along with the individual deputized
directors, a defendant for purposes of the statute in a government en-
forcement or private9 5 proceeding.96
90. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 710-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a 'd
menz., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
91. "[Tlhere is no doubt that the issue of 'deputization' in this case... is entirely.unsettled
and unquestionably is in genuine controversy." Id at 712 (footnote omitted).
92. See notes 93-102 infra and accompanying text.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1976) (emphasis added). See note 1 supra for pertinent text.
94. "The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include
corporations. . . ." Clayton Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (1976). The court in United States v.
Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a.f'dmenz, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975),
while explicitly recognizing the Clayton Act definition of "person," nevertheless held resolution of
the 'corporation as director' issue unnecessary to consideration of the Government's motion for
summary judgment. Id at 711. Despite the propriety of the court's conclusion, the internal con-
sistency of its treatment of the issue leaves much to be desired.
95. See notes 40-41, 45 supra. The basis of the private injunctive action is § 16 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), while treble damages may be sought under § 15 of the Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
96. See note 94 supra See also Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at
374-75, where the author, relying in part on the Clayton Act definition of "person," concludes that
the only valid prerequisite to holding a corporation in violation of § 8 is the factual determination
of whether a "deputization" actually occurred.
One court has held, in a nondeputization context, that policy considerations mandate holding a
corporation in violation of § 8. In SCM Corp. v. FTC, 565 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1977), the Commis-
sion alleged that a direct interlock in violation of§ 8 existed between SCM and Kraftco. In refus-
ing to enter into a consent order, SCM claimed that a corporation is not a proper defendant to a
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A less straightforward but equally persuasive argument in favor of
the deputization theory is predicated upon a similar concept that has
developed under section 16(b), the short-swing profits provision, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 91 A line of section 16(b) cases holds
that a corporation is accountable for the short-swing profits it realizes
through trading in the stock of another corporation on whose board its
deputized director sits.98 In so deciding, the courts inferentially affirm
the validity of the deputization concept.
In Cleveland Trust the Government argued for application of this
reasoning in the corporate interlock context.9 9 The court, in respond-
ing to the Government's motion for summary judgment, recognized the
16(b) argument but did not pass on the applicability of the 16(b) deci-
sions to section 8 of the Clayton Act.' ° "Meaningful analysis" was
deferred until development of a full record.' 0' This abstention allows
for application of the 16(b) analogy to a section 8 interlock under
proper circumstances. 0 2
§ 8 suit. The court held otherwise, reasoning that Congress intended the statute's prohibitions to
extend to corporations. Id at 811. The court reinforced its conclusion by reference to § 11(b) of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1976), which authorizes the FTC to issue an "order requiring
such person [violating § 8] to ... rid itself o  the directors chosen contrary to the provisions of
[§ 8]." (Emphasis added.) The court concurred in the Commission's argument that only a corpo-
ration could rid itself of a director, 565 F.2d at 8 10-11, thereby strengthening its decision. See also
Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 484 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1973) (corporate plaintiff has standing
under § 8 to request judicial removal of a director whose position on its board violated the statute
insofar as "[t]he corporation itself is a potential defendant in litigation which the government may
initiate to enforce § 8"); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., [1952-53] Trade Cas. (CCH)
167,561 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (interlocked companies violated § 8 by acquiescing in the dual director-
ship of the implicated individual). For reasoned analyses concluding that an interlocked corpora-
tion is a proper party-defendant to a § 8 suit, see Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8
of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 148-50 (adopting conclusion of SCM); Comment, Keys to
Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 374 (corporation is a "person" and thus falls within § 8
language). Butsee Wilson, supra note 3, at 322-23, where the author concludes that "the Section
8 status of interlocked corporations remains an open question."
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
98. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1036
(1970); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Blau
v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
99. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699, 711-12 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a 'd
mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
100. Id The court concluded that the "language, purpose, and history" of § 16(b) rendered
the statute of questionable significance in the corporate interlock context.
101. Id at 712.
102. Application of section 16(b) reasoning in the corporate interlock context has received
commentator support. See, ag., Halverson, Interlocking Directorates--Present Antitrust Enforce-
ment Interest Placed in Proper.4nalyticalPersectie, supra note 3, at 403-04 n.55; Comment, Inter-
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Cleveland Trust was settled one year later by the filing of a consent
decree which impliedly adopted the Government's arguments.10 3 This
lack of a decision on the merits resulted in the forfeiture of an opportu-
nity to place significant restrictions on the legality of deputization inter-
locks. Until deputization issues as pronounced as those in Cleveland
Trust are decided on the merits, the legal boundaries of this form of
indirect interlock will remain nebulous.
B. Parent-Subsidiary Interlocks
Despite the conceptual simplicity of the parent-subsidiary interlock,
interpretive difficulties analogous to those encountered in the deputiza-
tion context hinder the proscriptive force of section 8.104 Like other
indirect interlocking schemes, the purpose of the parent-subsidiary in-
terlock is to establish intercorporate communication without satisfying
the competition requirement. °5 Distinguishing the parent-subsidiary
interlock from the deputization relationship, however, is the desire to
establish direct intercourse between the parent corporations of compet-
ing subsidiaries rather than deferring to the influence of a third party
corporate director. J
Determination of the legality of a parent-subsidiary interlock is par-
ticularly complicated because the competition is between the subsidiar-
ies rather than their interlocked parents. l°6 The paramount question in
locking Directorates and Section 8 ofthe Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 149 n.80; Comment, Keys to
Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 374 n.103.
103. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,611 (N.D. Ohio).
The decree prohibited Cleveland Trust from hiring or retaining as an officer or employee any
individual who was a director of one of the interlocked industrial corporations or a subsidiary
thereof when a director of the second interlocked company or a subsidiary thereof was also em-
ployed by the defendant bank for so long as the interlocked manufacturing companies were in
competition with one another. See Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust En-
forcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, supra note 3, at 404; Halverson, Should
Interlocking Director Relationshps Be Subject to Regulation and, I/ So, What Kind?, supra note 3,
at 342 n.4; Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 ofthe Clayton Act, supra note 3, at
149 n.80; Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 374 n.99.
104. One commentator notes, for example, that "[there is nothing in the legislative history to
indicate that Congress even considered the situation where the same person is the director of one
company and the director of a parent of a competing company." 16C J. VoN KALINOWSK1, supra
note 3, § 20.02[3][a], at 20-24 n.40. See also FTC REPORT, supra note 3, at 18; Kramer, supra note
3, at 1268 n. 11 and accompanying text, quoted at note 76 supra.
105. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Keys to Unlock the
Interlocks, supra note 3, at 376.
106. The competition may either be between the subsidiaries or between the subsidiary and
the entity interlocked with the parent. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59:943
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/13
Number 3] PARENT-SUBSIDIARY INTERLOCKS
a section 8 challenge to a parent-subsidiary interlock, therefore, is
whether the interlocked parent dictates the policies and operations of
its competing subsidiary and, if so, to what extent.10 7
Assuming the exercise of close control by a parent over its subsidi-
ary, logic compels the imputation of the subsidiary's business to the
parent for purposes of the antitrust laws.0 8 A finding of strong paren-
tal influence is crucial under section 8 for two reasons. First, it may be
necessary to attribute the business of the subsidiary to the dominating
parent so that the "engaged in commerce" requirement is satisfied.10 9
107. See notes 108-51 infra and accompanying text.
108. The most limited purpose that can be attributed to section 8 is prevention of the
anticompetitive effects caused by interlocks among competitors. If a parent exercises
sufficient control over its subsidiary's policies and operations, then an interlock between
the parent and the subsidiary's competitor presents the same problem as if the parent
itself directly competed with its interlocked partner. Use of section 8 against such inter-
locks merely fulfills that section's purpose.
Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 377.
109. See note 16 supra.
The question whether the business of a subsidiary should be imputed to its parent for purposes
of the "engaged in commerce" requirement of an antitrust or other regulatory statute has gener-
ally arisen in non-§ 8 contexts. See, e.g., North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686 (1946), in
which the Supreme Court announced the basic rule controlling application of the "engaged in
commerce" requirement in situations involving parent-subsidiary relationships. In North Ameri-
can the Court said:
Historical ties and associations, combined with strategic holdings of stock, can on occa-
sion serve as a potent substitute for the more obvious modes of control [e.g., director
interlocks between a parent and its own subsidiary] .... Domination may spring as
readily from subtle or unexercised power as from arbitrary imposition of command ...
To conclude otherwise is to ignore the realities of intercorporate relationships.
I In view of North American's very substantial stock interest and its domination as
to the affairs of its subsidiaries, as well as its latent power to exercise even more affirma-
tive influence, it cannot hide behind the faqade of a mere investor. Their acts are its acts
in the sense that what is interstate as to them is interstate as to North American... . They
make even more inescapable the conclusion that North American bears not only a
"highly important relation to interstate commerce and the national economy,".., but is
actually engaged in interstate commerce.
Id at 693, 695-96 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (case arising under § 1 l(b)(l) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1976)). As to the issue of interlocks
between a parent and its own subsidiary, see In re Penn Cent. Sec. Lit., 367 F. Supp. 1158, 1168
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Jim Walter Corp., 90 F.T.C. 671, 740 (1977); Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip
op. at 54-56 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von Brand, J.). Such interlocks are relevant to
this Note to the extent they evidence parental control over a subsidiary.
The FTC has held, consistent with the Supreme Court's language in North American, that the
control-imputation standard is applicable in appropriate antitrust cases. In the context of a § 7
merger case, Jim Walter Corp., 90 F.T.C. 671 (1977), the Commission said:
Respondent's rather crabbed interpretation of the Court's language inAmerican Building
[United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975)], that "a
corporation must itself be directly engaged.., in interstate commerce," finds no sup-
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When the plaintiff is unable to establish that the parent is itself engaged
in commerce, it becomes necessary to look to the business of the closely
controlled subsidiary in an effort to meet this requirement."10 Courts
are, however, hesitant to use this approach."'
In Borg-Warner Corporation,"2 a 1980 section 8 case involving
manufacturers of automotive replacement parts, an administrative law
judge did apply this reasoning to the facts presented. Pursuant to an
acquisition of Borg-Warner stock by Bosch GmbH, a German corpora-
tion, two directors sitting simultaneously on the boards of Bosch
GmbH and Bosch U.S., the German company's wholly-owned Ameri-
can subsidiary, assumed positions on Borg-Warner's board."13  The
FTC issued a complaint alleging that the arrangement constituted an
illegal interlock insofar as Bosch U.S. competed directly with Borg-
Warner.'" 4 The Commission argued that Bosch GmbH's close control
and supervision over Bosch U.S. compelled the imputation of the sub-
port in that decision. Nowhere in that case is there the slightest hint that a corporation
operating through its subsidiaries, which in turn are admittedly involved in interstate
commerce, falls outside the reach of Section 7 because it is not deemed to be "engaged in
commerce."
Id at 740. See also Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 53-56 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial
decision), in which Judge von Brand highlights the history of the control test as applied to the
"engaged in commerce" requirement of §§ 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act citing, inter alia, the above
quoted cases. The judge based application of the control concept to the competition requirement
upon a reasoned analysis consisting first of the use of the concept to establish the parent's engage-
ment in commerce. Although inherent in a finding that the parent is a competitor by virtue of its
subsidiary's business is a determination that it is also "engaged in commerce," see text accompa-
nying note 122 infra, courts have chosen to take the easier route and sidestep the logical step-by-
step reasoning of Borg-Warner. Avoidance of this fundamental reasoning by other courts has
perhaps led to the failure of the control concept to gain a foothold in § 8 litigation. In any event,
use of the test in the interlock context seems entirely justified.
110. See notes 112-16 infra and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978);
Schechtman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afl'd, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957);
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 71,678
(S.D.N.Y.). But f United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 656 F.2d 428,450 (9th Cir. 1981)(control
standard applicable in determining parent's status as competitor), rev'g, 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (bank or bank holding company status of parents and subsidiaries on one side of bank-
insurance company director interlocks an impediment to § 8 violation under indus-
trial/commercial interlock provision of statute). These decisions are limited to consideration of
the competition requirement, but to the extent they involve a determination of engagement in
commerce they are pertinent to this reasoning. See also note 125 infra.
112. No. 9120 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von Brand, J.).
113. Id at 6.
114. Id at 2-3. The FTC also alleged that the interlock violated § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See note 159 infra for pertinent
language.
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sidiary's business and competition with Borg-Warner to the parent for
purposes of the section 8 "engaged in commerce" and competition
requirements.' 1 5
For purposes of imputing the business of the subsidiary, Bosch U.S.,
to the parent, Bosch GmbH, the administrative law judge drew exclu-
sively on an identical concept adopted in section 7 merger cases."16
This analogy gives content to the control concept, thereby expanding
the prohibitory effect of section 8 to include the parent-subsidiary inter-
lock within the statute's authority. The reasoning in Borg- Warner evi-
dences a practical approach to modern corporate realities, giving a
common sense meaning to the statute that elevates substance over
form. Such a practical approach has been employed to fortify other
antitrust laws but has been slow to gain a foothold in the context of
director interlocks.
The second important function of the control concept involves im-
puting the competition of the subsidiary to the parent to satisfy the
competition requirement." 7 For example, in a variation II parent-sub-
sidiary interlock,"' attributing subsidiary x's commerce to parent A
would elevate A into direct competition with B."I9 Likewise, assigning
the competition of both competing subsidiaries to their interlocked par-
ents in a variation I interlock" ° would elevate the latter into direct
competition with one another.'' This imputation of the subsidiary's
competition to the parent for purposes of the competition requirement
would satisfy the "engaged in commerce" provision as well.122 Again,
115. Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 2-3 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von
Brand, J.). The § 5 claim was upheld by the judge. Id at 56-58.
116. Id at 53-54, 56. See note 16 supra for judicial interpretation of the § 7 "engaged in
commerce" requirement. See also note 109 supra. The judge also held § 7 standards applicable to
the competition requirement. Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 46.
117. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
118. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
119. See, eg., United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd,
656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981); Schechtman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), a'd, 244
F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
120. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
121. See, ag.. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.),
afdin part and rev'd and remanded in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Cleve-
land Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a.f'dmem, 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975);
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,678
(S.D.N.Y.).
122. See, eg., Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 53, 56 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial
decision) (von Brand, J.).
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however, courts have not accepted this reasoning.1
23
Cleveland Trust 124 is one of the few cases dealing with the issue of
parental control over a subsidiary that did not result in an immediate
dismissal of the argument. 25  In ruling against the Government's mo-
123. See note 111 supra.
124. 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), a f'dmem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
125. See cases cited in note 111 supra. In United States v. Crocker Nat'l Corp., 422 F. Supp.
686 (N.D. Cal. 1976), ree'd, 656 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1981) the district court acknowledged the
concept underlying the control theory but nevertheless held it inapplicable to the facts of the case:
Even assuming that the control which the bank holding companies exercised over their
subsidiary banks was sufficient to attribute the subsidiary banks' activities to their par-
ents, it seems that the subsidiaries' status as banks, and hence their exemption from the
fourth paragraph of section 8, should similarly be attributed to those parents.
Id at 704. See note I supra for the text of the fourth paragraph of § 8. The district court in
Crocker thus adopted the control-attribution doctrine to the extent it immunized the interlocked
parents from a § 8 violation via the exemption afforded the bank subsidiaries under the same
statutory provision.
On appeal the Ninth Circuit expressly held the control concept applicable in determining
whether a parent competes for purposes of the § 8 industrial/commercial interlock provision. 656
F.2d at 450. The court stated:
A parent corporation is not a competitor of another corporation merely because its
subsidiary is [citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195,
1205 (2d Cir. 1978). See note 144 infra.] On the other hand, to interpret Section 8 as
meaning that the business activity of the subsidiary can never be considered in determin-
ing whether the parent is a "competitor" within the meaning of Section 8 would assume
that Congress intended to permit such a simple and obvious means of avoidance as to
render the statute meaningless ....
Whether for the purposes of Section 8 the business of a subsidiary is to be attributed to
a parent in determining if the parent competes with another corporation with which it is
interlocked, turns upon the extent of the control exercised by the parent over the subsidi-
ary's business.
If the parent substantially controls the policies of its subsidiary, it may fairly be said, in
the language of the competing corporations provisions of Section 8, that the "business
and location" of the parent include the business and location of the subsidiary.
Id. The circuit court reversed the district court and held that interlocks violated § 8. For parallel
reasoning in the "engaged in commerce" context, see note 109 upra.
The district court in Kennecutt Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd and remanded in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978), used the
control-attribution doctrine to find a contemplated interlock in violation of § 8. Id at 965-66.
The court of appeals, however, held this reasoning incorrect and reversed the lower court's deci-
sion on the § 8 claim. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d
Cir. 1978). For a more detailed discussion of the case, see notes 132-45 infra and accompanying
text.
In Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem. Co., [1966] Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,678 (S.D.N.Y.), the court held that:
Subsidiary or parent corporations of those corporations in which there is an alleged
infringing interlocking directorate are not to be considered in determining whether com-
petition exists between the directed corporations .... The issue was not expressly adju-
dicated in the District Court in Schechtman v. Wolfson [citation omitted]. To the extent
that that decision can be understood to imply the contrary, it is not followed here.
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tion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that a more
thorough development of the facts concerning the degree of parental
influence exerted on the competing subsidiaries was necessary for an
informed consideration of the interlock issue. 126 The subsequent filing
of a consent decree,127 however, precluded the anticipated decision on
the merits and thereby eliminated an opportunity for the federal courts
to impose substantive limits on the legality of the parent-subsidiary
form of indirect interlock. Although the consent decree tacitly adopted
the Government's contentions, 28 its superficial nature significantly di-
minishes any value it might have in a future parent-subsidiary case
reaching a decision on the merits.
Cleveland Trust suggests that the introduction of ample evidence of
subsidiary domination could result in a ruling against the legality of the
interlock.129 Should substantial control1 30 over a subsidiary competing
with an interlocked corporation (or with the interlocked corporation's
controlled subsidiary) be established, the domineering interlocked par-
ent should be held per se in competition with the interlocked competi-
tor.13 ' By satisfying the direct competition requirement of section 8
that the indirect interlock was constructed to avoid, this per se rule
would effectively buttress the enforceability and deterrence value of the
statute.
Id at 82,065. The divestiture by one of the interlocked parents of its competing subsidiary and a
finding that any competition among the interlocked parents and their subsidiaries was de minimis
were further bases for dismissal of the § 8 claim. Id at 82,065-66. The Paramount court's conclu-
sion that Schechtman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aft'd, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.
1957), only inferentially recognized the existence of a parent-subsidiary form of interlock is
accurate.
126. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 669, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aj'd
mem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir. 1975).
127. United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., [1975-2] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 60,611 (N.D. Ohio).
128. See note 103 supra.
129. See notes 126, 128 supra and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 54 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial deci-
sion), in which Judge von Brand discusses the degree of control necessary to impute the business
of a subsidiary to the parent. Application of that standard to an elaborate factual determination
in Borg- Warner resulted in a holding that the interlock violated § 8. Id at 54-56. See notes 112-
16 supra and accompanying text; notes 146-51 infra and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the possible creation of a per se rule extending to interlocks otherwise
outside the authority of § 8, see Turner, supra note 9, at 338-40; Comment, Interlocking Director-
ates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 153-57; Comment, Keys to Unlock the
Interlocks, supra note 3, at 384-85.
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In a 1978 case, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss- Wright Corp. ,132 the
District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the pro-
hibitory policy of section 8 requires consideration of a subsidiary's
competition in passing on the validity of a parental interlock. 133 The
litigation centered on Curtiss-Wright's attempt to acquire control of
Kennecott through stock purchases and the election of representatives
to Kennecott's board. 134 Alleging antitrust and securities law viola-
tions,135 Kennecott sought a permanent injunction to prohibit Curtiss-
Wright from further solicitation of proxies, to foreclose voting of the
Kennecott shares and proxies already held, and to order divestiture of
the acquired stock. 136 Kennecott claimed, in particular, that the place-
ment of a Curtiss-Wright director on its board would constitute a viola-
tion of section 8. 13 Although the parties did not compete directly,
Curtiss-Wright's second-tier subsidiary, National Filter Media, did
compete with the Filter Media Division of the Carborundum Com-
pany, itself a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kennecott. 13
Reasoning that modem corporate business practices dictate treat-
ment of a parent and its subsidiaries as a single entity for purposes of
the statute, 139 the court found that the parent corporations were in com-
132. 449 F. Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y.), afe'd in part and rev'd and remanded inpart, 584 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1978).
133. There is authority that, for the purposes of this section [§ 81, the business of subsidi-
ary corporations is not to be considered in determining whether competition exists be-
tween the two parent corporations. Paramount Pictures Corp. . Baldwin-Montrose Chem.
Co., 1966 Trade Cases 71,678 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). That authority, however, ignores the
reality of intercorporate relationships and the goal of Section 8 in preventing "a potential
conflict of interest or a potential frustration of competition." Protecioseal Co. . Baran-
cik, 484 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1973). Accord, United States . Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). We, therefore, read Section 8 as prohibiting inter-
locking directorships between parent companies whose subsidiaries are competitors. In
re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 965-66 (S.D.N.Y.), a fd in
part andrev'd and remanded inpart, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978). The § 8 issue arose as a result
of Curtiss-Wright's attempt to elect one of its directors to Kennecott's board. Therefore, the case
involved only a potential parent-subsidiary interlock.
134. Id at 955.
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id at 962.
138. Id Curtiss-Wright held an interest in National Filter Media by virtue of its majority
ownership of Dorr-Oliver, Inc., which owned virtually all of the outstanding shares in National
Filter Media. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1202-03 (2d Cir.
1978).
139. See note 133 supra.
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petition with one another,"4 thereby establishing both the third and
fourth elements of a section 8 violation. 4' Despite its failure to ad-
dress the control issue as such, the court implied approval of the doc-
trine in its discussion of the realities of contemporary corporate
conduct. 142
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, 43 concluding that section 8
does not establish a general rule prohibiting director interlocks between
parent corporations whose subsidiaries compete.'" In its carefully
worded opinion, the circuit court conceded that the existence of "close"
parental control over the competing subsidiary could mandate a con-
trary result. "4' This conclusion leaves open the possibility that parent-
subsidiary interlocks eventually will be brought within the enforcement
perimeter of section 8.
In Borg-Warner,'" the administrative law judge relied upon this
loophole in the Second Circuit's Kennecolt Copper opinion as support
for the control test. 17 The judge cited Cleveland Tust' 48 in concluding
that the control issue must be considered for purposes of establishing
both the "engaged in commerce" and competition requirements in a
section 8 action against a parent-subsidiary interlock. 149  As a result,
140. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 449 F. Supp. 951, 966 (S.D.N.Y.), a 'd
inpart and rev'd and remanded in part, 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
141. Id
142. Id See note 133 supra.
143. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1978).
144. This general rule [announced by the district court] is not supported by the language
of the statute, its legislative history, or the few pertinent cases. See UnIted States v. Cleve-
land Trust Co., 392 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ohio 1974), ajf'dmem., 513 F.2d 633 (6th Cir.
1975); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Montrose Chem Co., 1966 Trade Cas.
71,678 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). We decline to adopt it. We need not conjecture about the possi-
ble application of the statute to a parent corporation that closely controls and dictates thepolicies of its subsidiary. See United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra, 392 F. Supp. at
712.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1978) (footnote
omitted).
145. See note 144 supra.
146. No. 9120 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von Brand, J.).
147. Id, slip op. at 52.
148. See notes 124-28 supra and accompanying text. The Second Circuit cited Cleveland Trust
for the contrary position in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1205
(2d Cir. 1978). See note 144 supra.
149. Borg-Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 53-56 (FrC June 30, 1980) (initial decision)
(von Brand, J.). The judge presented an exhaustive list of factual data substantiating the high
degree of control exercised by the parent, Bosch GmbH, over its wholly owned subsidiary, Bosch
U.S. Id at 54-56. Ascription of the subsidiary's business to the parent for purposes of the § 8
Washington University Open Scholarship
972 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:943
the judge held the statute applicable to the interlock between Bosch
GmbH/Bosch U.S. and Borg-Warner,' 5 0 a significant decision in view
of prior judicial treatment of the control issue. The extent to which the
holdings of this initial administrative decision will survive anticipated
review remains an open question. 15'
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite detailed analyses confirming the widespread existence of di-
rect and indirect interlocks,' 52 there is a lack of empirical evidence cor-
roborating the anticompetitive effects of such relationships.' 53
Nevertheless, the congressional intent in enacting section 8'54 and the
power to influence the functioning of markets inherent in an effective
competition requirement automatically establishes the "engaged in commerce" element of the
statutory violation. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
150. The record demonstrates the requisite degree of control by Bosch GmbH [the parent
interlocked with Borg-Warner] over the subsidiary [competing with Borg-Warner] so as
to bring it within the purview of Section 8 of the Clayton Act. Bosch GmbH had the
power, whether or not exercised, to influence or control those decisions which might
involve violations of the antitrust laws.
Borg Warner Corp., No. 9120, slip op. at 56 (FTC June 30, 1980) (initial decision) (von Brand, J.).
The case involved a classic variation II parent-subsidiary interlock. See text accompanying note
74 supra.
151. The case is presently pending on appeal before the full FTC.
152. See note 6 supra.
153. See, e.g., Halverson, Interlocking Directorates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest
Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, supra note 3, at 394-95; Halverson, Should Interlocking
Director Relationships Be Subject to Regulation and, If So, What Kind?, supra note 3, at 348-49;
Wilson, supra note 3, at 329-30; Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 o the Clayton
Act, supra note 3, at 154-57. See generally Travers, supra note 3 (extensive analysis of interlocks
in terms of corporate management considerations, concluding that indirect interlocks should not
be attacked under a per se rule, favoring instead a case by case approach to determine whether
competition is in fact affected). Some authorities conclude, however, that a common sense ap-
proach should be taken to interlock enforcement regardless of the existence or nonexistence of
analyses substantiating the anticompetitive effects of such relationships. See, e.g., STAFF REPORT,
supra note 3, at 230 ("[d]espite the lack of evidence demonstrating specific abuses that have re-
sulted from management interlocks, commonsense, practical observation, and abstract reasoning.
all support the conclusion that such effects should follow. It would be naive to think that the
ability of two corporations to compete is not impaired by common management members"); FTC
REPORT, supra note 3, at 36 "[The industrial/commercial interlock provision of § 8], based on the
practical certainty that an interlocking directorate between competitors had an adverse effect upon
competition, does not require for its enforcement any proof that in the particular instance the
expected effect actually exists."); Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 367-72
("[w]hile no empirical studies have been undertaken to analyze the economic consequences of
these interlocks [not within § 8's express prohibitions], logic and common sense lead to the pre-
sumption that they are anticompetitive," id at 386).
154. See note 38 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss3/13
Number 3] PARENT-SUBSIDIARY INTERLOCKS
interlock1 55 are sufficient justification for more energetic use of the stat-
ute. Formal enforcement procedures, however, often give way to more
summary compliance techniques.
56
Once the control test gains judicial acceptance, there is little question
that section 8 can reach parent-subsidiary interlocks.' 57 But such inter-
locking relationships are generally established between only a limited
number of corporations. The potential impact of a parent-subsidiary
interlock on competition is therefore minimal compared to that possi-
ble under a strong deputization interlock, particularly one approaching
institutional proportions.' Ironically, the deputization interlock is by
comparison more difficult to reach under the statute. This results be-
cause both identification of the interlock and competition relationships
among the immediate participants and determination of whether a
deputization has actually occurred are often tenuous. If section 8
proves inadequate in challenging indirect interlocks, alternate or sup-
plemental attacks can be mounted under either section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act'59 or section 1 of the Sherman Act. 160
155. See note 11 supra.
156. See notes 39-63 supra and accompanying text.
157. See Comment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks supra note 3, at 364-65, 373-77 ("[a] narrow
interpretation ofsection 8... is both contrary to congressional intent and unwarranted in light of
the dangers of unregulated interlocks that have become apparent over time").
158. See notes 11, 69, 79-83 supra and accompanying text.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations... from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
Subsection (a)(2) can be used to overcome the "corporation as defendant" problem, see notes 92-
101 supra and accompanying text, as the statute expressly includes corporations in its list of poten-
tial violators. For detailed consideration of § 5 of the FTC Act and its applicability to interlock-
ing directorates, see 16C J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 3, § 20.02[3][a], at 20-24.2 to 20-25;
Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 157-60;
Comment, Keps to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 377-84. See also Halverson, Interlocking
Directorates---Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, supra
note 3, at 404-05; Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relationshps Be Subject to Regulation
and IfSo, What Kind?, supra note 3, at 343, 349; Jacobs, supra note 9, at 208; Travers, supra note
3, at 821, 833, and cases cited therein; Wilson, supra note 3, at 327, 329; Note, supra note 3, at 439-
40.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Section I of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States ... is declared to be illegal." On application of § I of the
Sherman Act to interlocking directorates, see 16C J. VON KALINOWS1U, supra note 3, § 20.02[31[a],
at 20-24.2; Halverson, Should Interlocking Director Relationships Be Subject to Regulation and, If
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The unwillingness of courts to adopt the control-imputation standard
for determining whether a parent is engaged in an illegal interlock is
unfortunate. Consent decrees, cease and desist orders, and Justice De-
partment "jawboning" are effective to the extent that they dissolve ille-
gal interlocks, but they fail to provide adequate deterrent force. Unless
the agencies empowered to enforce the law do so with greater vigor,
bold corporations will continue to establish direct interlocks, secure in
the knowledge that at worst they will be required to disintegrate the
relationship. At the same time, those less resolute will make use of
more subtle relationships, such as the parent-subsidiary interlock.
A broader construction of section 8 could remedy this situation with-
out doing harm to the statute. The strategies proferred by the Depart-
ment of Justice in Cleveland Trust are indicative of the flexibility
inherent in the statute, a flexibility heretofore unrecognized as a result
of the courts' literal, and hence underinclusive, approach to the law. A
conscious retreat from dismissal of complaints upon the voluntary res-
ignation of an interlocked director,' 6 ' combined with a more elastic
reading of the statute, will discourage the parent-subsidiary and depu-
tization forms of indirect interlock as practicable methods of achieving
anticompetitive intercorporate communication. This can be accom-
plished only by an interpretation which gives greater emphasis to the
spirit of the law than to its letter.
The most effective means for challenging indirect interlocks would
be adoption of a per se rule analogous to the one enunciated in Sears
pertaining to direct interlocks'62 or the one suggested above in the con-
So, What Kind, supra note 3, at 343; Travers, supra note 3, at 821, 833; Comment, Interlocking
Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 159-60.
161. See discussion of United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953), at notes 55-60
supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 27-37 supra and accompanying text. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), arose in the context of a direct interlock between directly com-
peting corporations. Establishing a per se rule applicable to indirect interlocks is necessarily more
difficult due, in part, to the absence of clear cut competition and interlock relationships. Com-
mentators, however, appear averse to adoption of an indirect interlock per se rule of illegality.
For example, Halverson argues that "from an antitrust viewpoint, several factors lead the author
to believe that, in the absence of a showing of actual anticompetitive effects, a legislated per se
restriction of all vertical and indirect interlocks is unwarranted." Halverson, Interlocking Direc-
torates-Present Antitrust Enforcement Interest Placed in Proper Analytical Perspective, supra note
3, at 403. See id at 402-06, 409; Travers, supra note 3, at 851, 863-64; Wilson, supra note 3, at 329;
Comment, Interlocking Directorates and Section 8 of the Clayton Act, supra note 3, at 153-57. See
also note 131 supra. For suggestions relating to per se legislation aimed at indirect, as well as
direct, interlocks, see STAFF REPORT, supra note 3, at 231-32; Note, supra note 3, at 444-45; Coin-
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text of the parent-subsidiary control issue.163 For example, any non-
competing corporation having different agents on the boards of
competing businesses should be held per se in violation of section 8,
even with insufficient proof of actual deputization. Any harsh or overly
restrictive effects are offset by the understanding that this standard
would strengthen deterrence and facilitate enforcement. Judicial rec-
ognition could come as a result of FTC or Justice Department prod-
ding, but congressional initiative would clearly accelerate application
of the rule.
Borg- Warner should prove valuable in resolving a number of impor-
tant parent-subsidiary interlock questions. Evasion of the pertinent is-
sues as in Cleveland Trust and, to a lesser extent, Kennecott Copper will
only exacerbate and prolong the impotence of section 8 in controlling
indirect interlocks. Financial considerations and the presence of com-
plicated ancillary issues could prompt the parties to negotiate a pre-
judgment settlement. This possibility does not, however, detract from
the need for a final, reasoned decision on the merits. Such a judicial
rendering would serve to reduce confusion surrounding the application
of section 8 and give meaning to an important statute.
Robert Jay Preminger
ment, Keys to Unlock the Interlocks, supra note 3, at 384-86. On congressional consideration of a
new anti-interlock bill and for a general discussion of legislative attitudes to new legislation, see
Turner, upra note 9.
163. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
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